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complete analogy between a director and a trustee in that a director
can resign from his position while a trustee can only be relieved of his
duties by the court's permission. VNCNT IE= .
CONFLICT OF LAWS-BASIS FOR DIVORCE-JURISDICTIONAL
FACT CONCEPT.
Prior to the decision in the Haddock' case, the traditional theory
of divorce was that the action was in rem2 The marital status was
treated as the res,' thus making actual notice to non-residents unneces-
sary when one of the spouses was domiciled within the domiciliary
forum,4 due process being satisfied by constructive service upon a non-
resident when the nature of the action is in rem.'
Atherton v. Athertonl is the well known example of this theory.
In that case the spouses were domiciled in state X. The wife estab-
lished a separate domicile in state Y. . The spouse domiciled in X
brought suit in X against the absent spouse, giving notice by construc-
tive service, and the court granted a divorce to the domiciled spouse In
X. Subsequently the spouse in Y brought action in Y for a divorce
against the absent spouse. The absent spouse appeared and set up the
decree he obtained in X, and the Supreme Court sustained the argument
that state Y must give the state X decree full faith and credit in
state Y.
This theory is easily applied in proceedings when a tangible asset
is the res because the res remains within one jurisdiction, but when the
res is changed to an intangible object such as the marriage status, then
difficulties multiply rapidly. For example, the absent spouse who has
part of the marital res with him may never hear of the proceedings
against him, and yet if he were to appear in the suit he would easily
disprove the allegations of the complaining spouse. The Atherton case
presents many disadvantages in holding the divorce action to be in
rem
7
The Supreme Court, in 1906, decided the Haddock case.8 There
one spouse was domiciled in state X, the other in Y. The spouse domi-
ciled in X, but not the last marital domicile, obtained a divorce from the
'Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
2Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901) ; See Ballard v. Hunter,
204 U. S. 241 (1907); Hughes v. Hughes, 211 Ky. 799, 275 S. W. 121
(1925); Harding v. Allen, 9 Greenl 140 (Me. 1832).
3Story, Conflict of Laws (1924), Secs. 229-230; Beale, Haddock
Revisited (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417 at 418.
'Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
5Tibbets v. Olson, 91 Fla. 824, 108 So. 679 (1926); Axtell v. Axtell,
181 Ga. 24, 181 S. E. 295 (1935); Hinners v. Banville, 114 N. J. Eq. 348,
168 Atl. 618 (1933).
6 181 U. S. 155 (1901).
7 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 100 (1887); Kempson v. Kempson,
63 N. J. Eq. 783, 52 Atl. 360 (1902).
8 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
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state X court. The defendant spouse was not served with process in the
action while personally within the X jurisdiction, nor did she appear or
consent to the jurisdiction of the court. Subsequently the spouse in Y
brought action for divorce and the absent spouse set up the state X
decree as a bar to the action in state Y.
Now, if this divorce is not given full faith and credit in state Y,
it would appear that a logical result would be reached, as the absent
spouse has neither consented to the jurisdiction of the X court nor
appeared. If this decision is sound, then it appears that Haddock v.
Haddock overrules Atherton v. Atherton; however, in the Haddock
decision the majority report expressly states that the Atherton case is
Is not overruled, but that the two cases differ, because in the former
the divorce was granted in the last matrimonial domicile.21 Mr. Justice
Holmes, in his minority opinion in Haddock v. Haddock, expresses the
belief that the cases are expressly contra, and that the Atherton case is
overruled." Four years later, however, Tlompson v. ThompsonYP reaf-
firmed the AtLerton decision.
It appears from the facts in the Atherton case that the husband in
state X forced his wife to leave and establish a separate domicile, yet
she was precluded from obtaining a divorce when the husband remained
at the matrimonial domicile. But in the Haddock case the husband in
state X was not allowed full faith and credit for the divorce he obtained
while domiciled in X. Now it is a settled rule that if the court in state
X had jurisdiction in the Haddock case, then the decree would be
entitled to full faith and credit in other statesY4 If it was not entitled
to full faith and credit it must be because of lack of jurisdiction.15 The
majority opinion states that the decree might be good in X but void in
another jurisdiction." This reasoning brings us to the conclusion that
the parties might be married outside of X ,but unmarried within X.
Professor Beale, realizing the disadvantages and injustices of a
situation such as this, has undertaken to explain the Haddock case
under a new theory.17 He says that the court in state X was without
jurisdiction to grant the decree because of the fault of the domiciled
plaintiff in deserting the absent spouse. This interpretation makes
fault a jurisdictional fact, and in order for the domiciled plaintiff to-
'Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
'*181 U. S. 155 (1901).
"201 U. S. 562 at 584-585 (1906).
-201 U. S. 562 at 629 (1906).
- 226 U. S. 551 (1913).
" 201 U. S. 562 at 572 (1906).
"Dean v. Dean, 241 N. Y. 240, 149 N. E. 844 (1925).
"201 U. S. 562 at 573 (1906).
"Beale, Conflict of Laws, pp. 483-484; Beale, Constitutional Protec-
tion of Decrees for Divorce (1906), 19 Harv. L. Rev. 586; Beale, Had-
dock Revisited (1926), 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417.
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have a valid claim for divorce, he must be without fault.13 This posi-
tion of Mr. Beale, adopted by the Restatement of Conflicts," is taken
to reconciliate the two extremes: on the one side-those who considered
the marital status as indivisible and capable of being present at only
the place," and those who considered the marriage res as divisible and
following both spouses to their separate domiciles.2 The Restatement
cites three instances where the res is present:
1. The absent spouse has consented that the other spouse
acquires a separate home.
2. Is personally subject to the jurisdiction of the domiciled
spouse's state.
3. By his or the absent spouse's misconduct or fault has
ceased to have the right to the acquisition of such separate homeY
Now an obvious -objection to such a theory is the fact that courts
in states X and Y will decide differently upon the jurisdictional facts
involved. This is true, and Professor Beale attempts to answer this
by saying:
"Since the question involves giving full faith and credit to the
decree of the first court, there will always be an appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States if the second court finds the
jurisdictional facts differently from the first; and the question can
therefore be definitely settled.?
There appears to be a better solution to this problem, and that is
for all states to adopt a uniform act to define and explain jurisdictional
facts involved.- But considering the probability that neither will be
adopted, it would appear to be a much better situation to have the
courts differ upon a finding of fact than to face the certainty that in
one state spouses will be married, while in another they will be single.M
JoHN H. GOAD.
"9Very few courts have adopted this theory. However, in Delanoy
v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 27, 13 P. (2d) 719 (1932) the opinion uses the argu-
ments and theories of Mr. Beale and cites what is now Restatement,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 113. See Miller v. Miller, 201 Iowa 1193, 206
N. W. 262 (1925) which gives its interpretation of the New York atti-
tude that approaches the jurisdictional fact concept.
"Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 113.
2Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier, Privy Council (1895) A. C. 517;
Alberta v. Cook, (1926) A. C. 444.
Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U. S. 604 (1870); 'Williamson v. Osenton,
252 U. S. 619 (1914); People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78 (1879); Ditson v.
Ditson, 4 R. I. 87 (1856); See Gould v. Gould, 235 N. Y. 14, 138 N. E.
490 (1923) where the court apparently proceeded on an in personain
theory altogether.
2The writer presumes that home is used to mean domicile.
3Haddock Revisited (1926), 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417 at 428.
24Revised Statutes of Kansas (1923) Sec. 60-5; Perkins v. Perkins,
225 Mass. 82 at 87, 113 N. E. 841 at 843 (1916); See The Uniform Juris-
diction Act, which was adopted by Vermont in 1931 and repealed in
1933. Laws of Vermont (1933) No. 37, page 67.
IDunham vr." Dunham, 162 Ill. 589, 44 N.,E. 841 (1896); Hunt v.
Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217 (1878). " . ...
